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This paper constructs and estimates a career decision model where individuals search for
both career matching and employer matching to understand wage growth and career mobil-
ity using the NLSY79. It departs from previous papers in that career mobility decisions and
participation decisions are explicitly modeled. I ﬁnd substantial returns to career-speciﬁc expe-
rience. However, college graduates’ wage grows little through career-match upgrading, which
results in a lower incidence of career changes than high school graduates. The ﬁnding suggests
that college graduates learn about their suitable careers before they enter a labor market.
1 Introduction
Wages of young workers grow rapidly. One major explanation is that the human capital accumu-
lation of young workers is fast. Another explanation is that they change jobs frequently and ﬁnd
a better match during the course of their careers. Human capital is often categorized as either
general or ﬁrm-speciﬁc, and matching is usually considered ﬁrm-speciﬁc. However, workers often
ﬁnd that knowledge and skills learned in a previous job are still useful in a new job, when the tasks
of the two jobs are related. This implies that human capital and matching could be better captured
at a broader level such as industry or occupation. Identifying the relative importance of different
types of skills and matching is useful for designing training programs and job placement services.
This paper’s objective is to construct and estimate a structural model of career search to eval-
uate the effects of speciﬁc experiences, and match qualities on wages and career decisions. In the
model, workers search for a better career match as well as a better employer match. They make
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decisions on labor force participation as well as on career and employer changes. Speciﬁcally,
workers are allowed to change employers while remaining in the same career or change both ca-
reer and employer if they are not satisﬁed with the matches. In addition to match-quality changes,
career-speciﬁc experience and employer tenure, as well as general experience increase wages. The
optimal search strategy in the model is characterized by a two-stage search in which a worker ﬁrst
searches for a career match and then searches for an employer, which is supported by evidence
from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). The model accounts for individuals’ un-
observed heterogeneity in wage, mobility, and participation. Family variables that affect mobility
and participation are also included in the model.
This paper is closely related to the seminal work by Neal (1999). He ﬁnds evidence of the
two-stage search in the NLSY and presents a highly stylized model where workers search for both
career match and employer match. One important limitation of the model is that human capital
accumulation is omitted. If career-speciﬁc human capital grows, the probability of career change
decreases with experience because individuals do not want to lose it. However, career-speciﬁc
human capital does not discourage employer changes within the same career. Thus, experienced
workers change employers within the same career, while inexperienced workers change employers
across careers, which is also consistent with the two-stage search. One of the important contribu-
tions of the paper is to include human capital accumulation to distinguish between match quality
and human capital.
The paper also contributes to a large literature of returns to speciﬁc experience and employer
tenure. Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991), and Altonji and Williams (2005) estimate
the returns to employer tenure using instrumental variable techniques and debate the magnitude.
Neal (1995) and Parent (2000) claim that the return to employer tenure is markedly reduced once
industry-speciﬁc experience is controlled. Kambourov and Manovskii (2007) ﬁnd that the return
to occupation-speciﬁc experience is more important for wage proﬁle than industry-speciﬁc expe-
rience and employer tenure. This paper considers skills similar to these recent contributions in
that skills are transferable within a career, but it takes different routes in methodology. In contrast
to these previous contributions, the participation decision and the mobility decision are explicitly
modeled. Consequently, this paper is able to account for unobserved heterogeneity at individual
level, career level, and employer level in these decisions.
Pavan (2006) extends Neal’s two-stage search model so that match quality grows stochasti-
cally over time and structurally estimates it. My model differs from his in a number of different
dimensions. First, the high school sample and the college sample are estimated separately. As I
will describe below, this has an important empirical implication. Second, the participation deci-
sion and the effects of family variables on the mobility decision are also considered. Finally, this
paper allows for a concave wage proﬁle in career-speciﬁc experience and tenure. In contrast, in
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Pavan (2006), wage growth due to the accumulation of speciﬁc skills is convex within career and
employer spells because a linear drift in logwages is assumed, which is pointed out by Kambourov
and Manovskii (2007).1 My model isﬂexible enough so that the predicted skill proﬁles areconcave
and the model ﬁts the observed job mobility patterns well.
The wage growth literature has paid scant attention to the different nature of careers between
high school graduates and college graduates. College graduates typically occupy professional or
management jobs, while many high school graduates occupy jobs demanding less skill, such as
craftsmen, operators, and laborers. The common assumption that the returns to experience and
tenure are homogeneous across careers seems to be strong. Skill speciﬁcity, on-the-job human
capital investment, and wage determination mechanisms may be very different across occupations.
Education is also associated with the career search pattern. Empirical papers, including Paglin
and Rufolo (1990), Arcidiacono (2004), and Joy (2006), ﬁnd a strong relationship between early
career jobs and the major ﬁeld of study in college. This evidence suggests that, to some extent,
college graduates have learned about their comparative advantages and the nature of different ca-
reers through the choice of a major ﬁeld of study. This paper estimates the model by separating
the high school graduate sample and the college graduate sample to take into account the different
nature of careers between them.
The structural model is numerically solved and the parameters are estimated by the Maximum
Likelihood. The parameter estimates are intuitive, and the evidence from simulation exercises
shows that the model ﬁts reasonably well to interesting features of the data. The results indicate
that the returns to general experience and employer tenure are, in fact, very different between high
school graduates and college graduates. The return to ﬁve-year general experience for a college
graduate’s wage is 16%, which is more than double the wage increase for a high school graduate
(7%). In contrast, the employer tenure of ﬁve years does not increase a college graduate’s wage,
but it increases the wage of a high school graduate by 7%. The return to ﬁve-year career-speciﬁc
experience is greater than the return to tenure, and is 11-12%.
The effects of match quality upgrading on wage growth are also found to be quite different
across education groups through a numerical simulation. In particular, the contribution of career-
match quality upgrading is small for college graduates. It increases their wages by only 2% during
the ﬁrst ten years in the labor market, which is considerably lower than the growth of high school
graduates’ wage through the same channel. This result suggests that college graduates learn about
their future careers before they enter a labor market, while high school graduates learn about ca-
reers by experiencing different jobs. As conﬁrmed by another counterfactual simulation, this low
returns to career search, as well as the high returns to career experience, are responsible for the
lower rate of career change for college graduates than high school graduates.
1This can be conﬁrmed by table 5 in Pavan (2006), for example.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section I pose a model. In section 3,
the data is described. I also present evidence that the fraction of within-career employer change
increases over time. Section 4 contains estimation results and an analysis of the model ﬁt to the
data. In section 5, counterfactual simulations are conducted to decompose wage growth and assess
the effects of matching and speciﬁc experiences on career mobility. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
2.1 Basic Model
I ﬁrst present a highly stylized model of career search. Although this basic model does not incor-
porate some important factors that affect career decisions, it is useful for illustrating the model’s
main feature. A more realistic empirical model that incorporates learning by doing, mobility costs,
and preference shocks will follow in the next subsection.
Workers are inﬁnitely lived and maximize the lifetime utility derived from match quality with
the career θ and the match quality with the employer ξ. In each period, workers choose among
three mutually exclusive alternatives: (1) remaining in the same career and the same employer, (2)
remaining in the same career, but changing employers, (3) changing both careers and employers.
Workers are not able to change careers when they stay with the same employer, because they are
still on the same line of tasks. When workers decide to change careers, they draw a new career-
match quality from the known ﬁxed distribution F. Similarly, a new employer match quality is
drawn from the known ﬁxed distribution G. Workers do not know their match qualities until they
actually take on a new task and work for a new employer. But, after the new match qualities are
drawn, they are precisely observed by all relevant agents in the economy. Thus, the model does
not include learning about match quality.
The instantaneous utility of a worker is given by u = θ +ξ. The economic environment for





V1(θ,ξ) = θ +ξ +βV(θ,ξ)
V2(θ,ξ) = θ +ξ +β
Z
V(θ,ξ0)g(ξ0)dξ0
V3(θ,ξ) = θ +ξ +β
Z Z
V(θ0,ξ0)f(θ0)g(ξ0)dθ0dξ0
where β is a discount factor and f and g are the probability density functions of career match and
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employer match. The value of remaining in the same career and with the same employer is given
byV1, the value of employer change isV2, and the value of career change isV3.
Neal (1999) ﬁnds that the worker’s optimal policy can be characterized by the following reser-
vation match-quality rule:
• Stop if ξ ≥ ξ∗ and θ +ξ ≥ θ∗+ξ∗.
• Change employers if ξ < ξ∗ and θ ≥ θ∗.
• Change careers and employers if θ ≤ θ∗ and θ +ξ ≤ θ∗+ξ∗.
This optimal policy implies that a career search consists of two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, workers
change careers and employers. In the second stage, they change employers but remain in the same
career. Workers never change careers once they enter the second stage of the search. Thus, the
probability of career change given that some change occurs decreases over time. This proposition
is the central feature of the career search of young workers.
2.2 Extended Empirical Model
Although the basic model clariﬁes the central feature of the career search model, it must incor-
porate many other features to be realistic and to ﬁt the data. First, the extended model includes
learning by doing. Wages increase with general work experience, career-speciﬁc experience, and
employer tenure. Topel (1991) ﬁnds signiﬁcant returns to employer tenure and Parent (2000) ﬁnds
large returns to industry tenure using an instrumental variable technique. These previous results
suggest that the returns to career and employer tenure should be included in the wage equation.
Second, the model allows for transitory preference shocks. The strict two-stage career search pre-
dicted by the basic model does not ﬁt to the data. Many workers change careers after making
an employer change within the same career. Some of observations are, perhaps, due to coding
errors, but some are real changes. To reconcile with this fact, transitory preference shocks are
included so that any choice patterns can occur with a positive probability. However, this still does
not change the main feature of the basic model in that the fraction of career change among any
changes decreases over time, at the estimated parameters. Third, non-work state is taken into ac-
count. Some young workers do not work after graduating from high school or college, although
the model mainly considers workers who are in the labor market. The model avoids endogeneity
due to selection into working state by explicitly incorporating non-work state. Lastly, entry costs
to a new career and a new employer are taken into account, to improve the model ﬁt to the data.
Theobjectiveofindividualsistomaximizethepresentvalueoftheirlifetimeutilityoveraﬁnite
horizon. When individuals work, they receive wages that depend on innate ability, match qualities,
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and experiences. Working individuals choose among four mutually exclusive alternatives: (1)
remaining in the same career and with the same employer, (2) changing employers but staying in
the same career, (3) changing both careers and employers, and (4) not working. To draw a new
career match quality, a new employer match quality, or both, individuals pay the entry costs. Match
qualities are drawn from the known ﬁxed distributions and are precisely observed immediately by
all relevant economic agents.
Non-working individuals who have worked previously choose among three mutually exclu-
sive alternatives: (1) working in the same career, (2) working in a new career, and (3) remaining
non-working. These individuals are able to maintain the career-match quality and career-speciﬁc
experience in the last career, because returning to the same career is commonly observed in the
data. Non-working individuals who have never worked choose between two alternatives: (1) be-
ginning to work and (2) remaining non-working. When they decide to begin to work, they draw a
career-match quality and an employer-match quality. Working and non-working individuals draw
match qualities from the same known distributions. The draws are immediately and precisely
observed.
The worker’s decision problem can be characterized by the Bellman equation. In the following,
subscripts for individuals are omitted for notational simplicity unless otherwise noted. Let GXt be
general work experience in age t. Similarly, CXt and FXt denote career-speciﬁc experience and
ﬁrm-speciﬁc experience, respectively. A vector of family variables such as marital status and
number of children is denoted by Zt. It is assumed that the family variables affect labor force
participation and the mobility of workers, but they do not affect wages. The decision of those who
are currently working and aret years old is denoted by an indicator variable djt. Individuals remain
in the same career and with the same employer when d1t = 1. They remain in the same career, but
change employers when d2t =1. Career change and employer change occur when d3t =1. Finally,
individuals choose not to work when d4t = 1. Notice that individuals are making decisions about
the next period’s job and employment status. Because choices are mutually exclusive, it is imposed
that ∑
4
j=1djt = 1 if currently working and ∑
4
j=1djt = 0 otherwise. Let St be a vector of state
variables at age t. The state variables include general experience GX, career-speciﬁc experience
CX, employer tenure FX, career match quality θ, employer match quality ξ, an iid productivity
shock ε, a vector of choice speciﬁc iid preference shocks ν, and a vector of family variables Z.







V1t(St) = u(wt,Zt)+ν1t +βEε,ν[Vt+1(St+1)|d1t = 1]
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V2t(St) = u(wt,Zt)−cE
e (Zt)+ν2t +βEξ,ε,ν[Vt+1(St+1)|d2t = 1]
V3t(St) = u(wt,Zt)−cE
c (Zt)+ν3t +βEθ,ξ,ε,ν[Vt+1(St+1)|d3t = 1]
V4t(St) = u(wt,Zt)+ν4t +βEν[Ut+1(St+1)|d4t = 1]
wt = w(GXt,CXt,FXt,θt,ξt,εt)
where u is utility function, cE
e is entry cost to a new ﬁrm, cE
c is entry cost to a new career, andU is
the value of non-working state. The law of motion of the deterministic state variables is
GXt+1 = GXt +1
CXt+1 = CXt +1 if d1t = 1 or d2t = 1 or d4t = 1
0 otherwise
FXt+1 = FXt +1 if d1t = 1
0 otherwise.
Notice that individuals do not lose career-speciﬁc experience when they choose not to work (d4t =
1) in the next period. The law of motion of match qualities is the followings, as readers may expect
from the subscripts of the expectation operator,
θt+1 = θt if d1t = 1 or d2t = 1 or d4t = 1
θt+1 ∼ N(0,σ2
θ) otherwise





νjt+1 ∼ Type I extreme value distribution for all j.
Notice that individuals do not lose the career-speciﬁc experience when they choose not to work
(d4t = 1) in the next period. The last parametric assumption that iid preference shocks follow type
I extreme value distribution makes this model a multinomial logit. The family variables evolve
exogenously over time and follow this transition process:
Zt+1 = h(Zt,t)
where h is a transition function for the family variables.
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e (Zt)+ν5t +βEξ,ε,ν[Vt+1(St+1)|d5t = 1]
U6t(St) = −cU
c (Zt)+ν6t +βEθ,ξ,ε,ν[Vt+1(St+1)|d6t = 1]
U7t(St) = ν7t +βEν[Ut+1(St+1)|d7t = 1]
where cU
e and cU
c are the entry costs to a new employer and a new career, respectively. It is
imposed that ∑
7
j=5djt = 1 if individuals are in a non-working state and have worked before and
that ∑
7
j=5djt = 0 otherwise. Remember that career-speciﬁc experience and career-match quality
are from the last time the individuals worked. Work experience and career-speciﬁc experience do
not change, because they are not working in this period. If individuals decide to work (d5t = 1
or d6t = 1), the next period’s ﬁrm-speciﬁc experience is zero (FXt+1 = 0), and they also draw a
new employer-match quality. When individuals decide to work in a new career (d6t = 1), the next
period’s career-speciﬁc experience is zero (CXt+1 = 0) and they also draw a new career match
quality.








c (Zt)+ν8t +βEθ,ξ,ε,ν[Vt+1(St)|d8t = 1]
N9t(St) = ν9t +βEν[Nt+1(St)|d9t = 1]
wherecU
c istheentrycosttoanewcareer. Whenindividualsdecidetowork, theydrawanewcareer
match quality and a new employer match quality. It is imposed that ∑
9
j=8djt =1 if individuals have
never worked before and that ∑
9
j=8djt = 0 otherwise.
2.2.1 Initial Conditions
Individuals make career decisions from the year they graduate from school to retirement age T (=
65.) The age at which individuals graduate from school is exogenously given and is different across
individuals. In the last year of schooling, they decide whether or not to work (d8t = 1 or d9t = 1)
the following year. Any work experience before graduating does not count. So, individuals start
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their careers with no experience (GX =CX = FX = 0.)
2.2.2 Preference and Technology
Utility Function The utility function for wages is given by
u(wt,Zt) = (α0,r+αZZt)·wt
where r is the subscript for individual type that is constant over time. This heterogeneity of utility
function is to capture the different responses to wage incentives across individuals. For example,
an individual with a high α has strong labor force attachment. Several empirical papers ﬁnd that
male labor supply is affected by marital status and the number of children in the household. The
speciﬁed utility function is consistent with the empirical evidence.
Wage Equation Wages are given by the following Mincerian-type equation
lnwt = ω0,r+ω1GXt +ω2GX2
t +ω3CXt +ω4CX2
t +ω5FXt +ω6FX2
t +θt +ξt +εt
where the intercept ωr,0 is allowed to vary across individuals.
Cost Function The entry cost functions to a new employer and a new career are determined by




where the superscript L is for the current employment status (working E or not workingU) and the
subscript n is for type of change (employer change e or career and employer change c.) In addition,
the entry costs vary across individuals depending on the type r. Family variables are included to
capture the effects of marital status and the children in the household on job mobility. Job changes
sometimes entail relocation and this is more costly for a family than a single individual, because
the wife’s new job and the school for children may also need to be searched for.
Family Variables The family variables Z include marital status M and number of children K,
and they exogenously change over time. The transition probabilities of marital status and number
of children are given by the functions of marital status and number of children in the last period
and age. Speciﬁcally, the transition probability has a probit form
Pr(Mt = 1|Mt−1,Kt−1,t) = Φ(um(Mt−1,Kt−1,t))
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where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.
2.3 Solution and Likelihood Function
The model is numerically solved by backward induction because this is a ﬁnite horizon problem.
Each individual is assumed to start making decisions in the year he graduates from school and
to retire at age 65. Following Keane and Wolpin (1997), the value function is approximated by
polynomial regressions, in order to decrease computational burdens. Speciﬁcally, the expected
value function (sometimes called the Emax function) is ﬁrst evaluated at some selected points in
the dimensions of general experience, career-speciﬁc experience, tenure, and match qualities for
any given age. Then the Emax function is approximated by a second-order polynomial. The dis-
tributions of both career and employer match quality are approximated by the discrete distribution
with ﬁve support points. The discount rate is set at 0.95.
The likelihood function is constructed using this numerical solution to the dynamic program-
ming. Following Rust (1987), the transition probability of exogenous variables (i.e. family vari-
ables Z) is separately estimated before the estimation of the choice probabilities. I assume there
are R(= 4) unobserved types of individuals. Because experiences are functions of the history of the
career choice variable dit = {dijt}9













where ti,0 is the age of graduation of individual i, ¯ ti is the age that individual i most recently
observed in the survey, πr is the probability that individual i is type r, and Prt is the conditional
choice probability of career choice and wage given the individual type r, his career history, and
the family variables. A vector of parameters to be estimated is given by Θ. The likelihood for the






where di = {dit}
¯ ti




The data are taken from the 1979 youth cohort of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The
NLSY consists of 12,686 individuals who were 14-21 years old as of January 1, 1979. The analysis
in this paper is based on the white males in the core random sample to reduce heterogeneity. Sub-
samples of high school graduates and college graduates are taken according to the following rules.
Individuals are included in the high school graduate sample if (1) their highest grade completed
is 12 in the most recent survey until 2004, and (2) they are 18 or younger in the 1979 interview.
The ﬁrst restriction excludes those who re-enter a school after entering a labor market. The second
restriction excludes individuals whose initial labor market experiences are missing in the survey.
Similarly, individuals are included in the college graduate sample if (1) their highest grade
completed is 16 years. The initial labor market experience is observed for all individuals in the
college graduate sample, because they are 21 or younger in the ﬁrst survey year. If a college grad-
uate went to graduate school after some years of work, his employment history before entering
graduate school is included in the sample. Those who went to graduate school right after complet-
ing undergraduate study are omitted from the college graduate sample. This sampling criterion is
necessary to control years of education precisely, because the link between education and career
is one of the important issues in this paper. Estimation results for an expanded college graduate
sample with those who went to graduate school are reported in appendix B.
To split the white male sample into the high school graduate sub-sample and college graduate
sub-sample, I use the highest grade completed. If this variable is missing in any given survey
year, the reported grade in the following year is used if available. If not, the reported grade in the
previous year is used. To determine individuals’ grade ever completed, I take the highest reported
grade throughout all the survey years. Out of 2439 white males in the cross-section sample, 252
individuals did not complete high school, 1027 individuals completed high school but did not go
to college, 493 individuals went to college for less than four years, and 667 individuals completed
four-year college education or higher. Notice that GED recipients are not counted as those who
completed high school.
To avoid initial condition problems, I omit individuals those who are 19 or older from the
high school sample. Out of 1027, 677 high school graduates remain in the sample. I also omit
17 individuals who report that they completed high school at age 17 or younger (660 individuals
remain). For 26 individuals out of 660, hours of work in a year never exceed 1000 hours throughout
all the survey years. After omitting them, I have 642 individuals remaining. Out of 642, 30
individuals did not work more than 1000 hours in any survey years after graduating from high
school (610 individuals remain). In estimating the structural model, I use continuous spells of work
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history and family variables. If work history except for wages or family variables are missing, I
drop all the information from that survey year on. After this procedure, I do not observe any work
experience more than 1000 hours in a year for 17 individuals. The ﬁnal sample size of high school
graduates is 593.
For the college graduate sample, the initial transition to the labor market is mostly observed be-
cause all individuals are 22 or younger at the ﬁrst survey year. I omit 14 individuals who report that
they completed a four-year college at age 21 or younger, and 653 individuals remain in the sample.
For 11 individuals out of 653, hours of work in a year never exceed 1000 hours throughout all
survey years. After omitting them, I have 642 individuals remaining. Out of 642, 157 individuals
did not work more than 1000 hours in any survey years after graduating from a four-year college.
Those who went to graduate school right after completion of undergraduate study are omitted at
this stage. Omitting these individuals, I have 485 individuals in the college graduates sample. If
work history except for wages or family variables are missing in a given survey year, I drop all the
information from that survey year on. After this procedure, I do not observe any work experience
more than 1000 hours in a year for 8 individuals. The ﬁnal sample size of college graduates is 478.
3.2 Variable Deﬁnitions
Labor force status after graduating is determined by the number of hours worked in a year. An
individual is considered to have worked during the year if he worked more than 1,000 hours.
Hourly wages and industry and occupation codes are assigned from the current or most recent
job. Hourly wages are deﬂated by the 2000 CPI. All wage observations less than $1 and more than
$100 are omitted. Marital status of individuals and the number of children in the household are
also used in the analysis.
Careerchangeinthispaperisdeﬁnedasasigniﬁcantchangeoftasksofjobs. Ifjobchangersare
unable to transfer their skills acquired in a previous job, this job change is not only an employer
change, but also a career change. From this perspective, I rely primarily on industry codes to
identify career changes in the data, which is consistent with the ﬁndings by Neal (1995, 1999)
and Parent (2000) that individuals lose a substantial fraction of their wages when they change jobs
across industries. Although skills are well captured at industry level, some exceptions may exist.
The tasks of some workers are not directly related to their employers’ products or services, but
are related to activities common across industries. For example, the tasks of an accountant are not
very different across industries. An accountant is able to transfer most of his skills from an old job
to a new one in a different industry. Thus, occupation codes are also included for the deﬁnition of
career change to address this issue.
I also assume that career change does not occur when an individual stays with the same em-
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ployer, as seen in the model above, for two reasons. First, when an individual stays with the same
employer, a change of industry code seems to be a coding error as discussed in Neal (1999). Sec-
ond, manyoccupationcodechangeswithinthesameemployeraremovestomanagementpositions.
It seems to be reasonable to consider this move as a promotion within the same career. Although
the tasks of a manager are different from those of his subordinates, the skills he acquired in the
previous position are certainly useful for performing management tasks. Thus, he still remains in
the same line of work.
Many previous empirical papers ﬁnd that occupation code in the NLSY is riddled with mea-
surement error. Measurement error in occupation code overstates occupation changes, which is
problematic for estimating the effects of career-speciﬁc experience and career matching on wages
and mobility. As mentioned above, two or more occupations are often reported across survey years
even when an individual stays with the same employer. While I do not know which one represents
the true occupation, one of them is likely to be the truth. Thus, comparing all reported occupations
between two employment spells can reduce biases due to measurement error. This method works
well particularly when multiple occupations are reported because they are similar to each other.
Given the discussion above, I empirically deﬁne career change as follows: an individual is consid-
ered to change careers if he changes employers, and any reported one-digit industry classiﬁcation
codes and any three-digit occupation codes do not match between the employment spell with the
new ﬁrm and that with the old ﬁrm.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics for the high school graduate sample and the college graduate sample are pre-
sented in table 1 and table 2. The average age of the pooled high school sample is 23.6 and that of
the pooled college sample is 26.3. The average general work experience of high school graduates
is 3.7 years, which is longer than that of college graduates (2.8 years.) Notice that any work ex-
periences before graduating school are not counted. The average career experience and employer
tenure of high school graduates are 2.5 years and 1.4 years, and those of college graduates are 2.4
years and 1.5 years. The annual job change rate and career change rate are calculated for indi-
viduals who worked for two consecutive years. Job separations due to transitions from work to
non-work are excluded. Both within- and between-career job changes are included. The annual
job change rate is 0.29 for high school graduates, and 0.23 for college graduates. Similarly, the
career change rate of high school graduates is 0.14 and 0.09 for college graduate, which implies
that about 50% of high school graduates’ job changes are career changes, while the rate is about
40% for the college graduates. The evidence shows that high school graduates change jobs and
careers more frequently.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for high school Graduates
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. Nobs
Age 17.00 20.00 23.00 23.60 27.00 32.00 6055
General Experience 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.67 6.00 14.00 6055
Career Experience 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.52 4.00 14.00 6055
Employer Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.43 2.00 14.00 6055
Employers per Individual 1.00 2.00 3.00 3.45 5.00 14.00 593
Careers per Individual 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.25 3.00 12.00 593
Employers within Career per Individual 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.20 2.00 9.00 593
Years Surveyed per Individuals 1.00 7.00 12.00 10.21 14.00 16.00 593
Job Change Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.29 1.00 1.00 4307
Career Change Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00 4307
Wage (2000 CPI) 1.02 8.03 10.98 12.12 14.69 83.77 4906
Married (at age 30) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.66 1.00 1.00 247
Has Children (at age 30) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.56 1.00 1.00 247
Table 2: Summary Statistics for College Graduates
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. Nobs
Age 21.00 24.00 26.00 26.33 29.00 35.00 3328
General Experience 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.83 5.00 13.00 3328
Career Experience 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.40 4.00 13.00 3328
Employer Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.54 2.00 12.00 3328
Employers per Individual 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.29 3.00 8.00 478
Careers per Individual 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.48 2.00 7.00 478
Employers within Career per Individual 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.81 1.00 5.00 478
Years Surveyed per Individuals 1.00 3.00 7.00 6.96 10.00 15.00 478
Job Change Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 2527
Career Change Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 1.00 2527
Wage (2000 CPI) 1.04 12.03 16.85 18.12 22.17 98.24 2932
Married (at age 30) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.00 211
Has Children (at age 30) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.44 1.00 1.00 211
The average hourly wage of high school graduates is $12, which is deﬂated by the 2000 CPI.
College graduates earn $18 per hour on average, which is about 50% more than high school gradu-
ates. The fractions of married individuals at age 30 are 0.66 and 0.67 for the high school graduates
and college graduates, respectively. The fractions of those who have one or more children at age
30 are 0.56 and 0.44 for the high school graduates and college graduates, respectively.
Logwage-experience proﬁles are presented in ﬁgure 1 for high school graduates and college
graduates. Both proﬁles are concave, while the slope for the college graduates is steeper. The
fraction of working individuals is plotted in ﬁgure 2 and it quickly increases with years of expe-
rience. The rate for the ﬁve-year-experience high school graduates is about 0.94, and that for the
ﬁve-year-experience college graduates is about 0.98. Figure 3 plots the probability that currently
employed individuals will decide to stay with their current employers. The probability of staying
increases with general work experience, and is higher for the college graduates. The probability
of changing employers within the same career is plotted in ﬁgure 4. The probability of changing
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careers is also plotted in ﬁgure 5. This probability decreases with experience for both education
groups. The probability that an employed individual decides not to work is shown in ﬁgure 6 and
this probability decreases with experience.
The most important feature of the data for this paper is that the fraction of employer change
within the same career increases with experience, which is shown in ﬁgure 7. The fraction is
calculated for those who worked for two consecutive years and changed employers. For both
education groups, an upward trend can be seen, although the conﬁdence interval is wide due to
the small sample size. A test for the null hypothesis that a time trend does not exist is conducted
under the following parametric assumptions. Let yi be an indicator variable that takes one if an
individual changes employers within the same career and takes zero otherwise. Let y∗
i = a+
bGXi+εi be a latent variable where GX is general experience and ε is normally distributed with
zero mean and unit variance. Assume that yi = 1 if y∗
i > 0 and yi = 0 otherwise. Table 3 presents
the estimation results of this probit model. The coefﬁcient for experience is signiﬁcantly positive
for both education groups and the null hypothesis is strongly rejected.
4 Estimation Results
This section presents and discusses the structural parameter estimates in tables 4, 7, 8, and 9. The
parameter estimates for the family variable transitions are not of central interest and are summa-
rized in appendix A.
First, I discuss the estimation result of the wage equation in table 4. The type of individuals
is ordered by the intercept of the wage equation. The wage function of high school graduates
is concave in general experience, career experience, and employer tenure. The returns to career
experience and tenure are of a similar magnitude. The estimated cumulative return to career ex-
perience of ﬁve years is about 0.11 and the return to employer tenure of ﬁve years is about 0.07.
The wage function of college graduates is also concave in general experience, career experience
and employer tenure. For college graduates, the estimated cumulative return to career experience
of ﬁve years is about 0.12 and the return to employer tenure of ﬁve years is about 0.03; the latter
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Table 4: Wage Equation
High School College
Estimates Std. Dev. Estimates Std. Dev.
Intercept (Type 1) 1.779 0.059 1.722 0.091
Intercept (Type 2) 2.074 0.024 2.168 0.041
Intercept (Type 3) 2.281 0.041 2.573 0.041
Intercept (Type 4) 2.401 0.027 2.921 0.051
GX 0.020 0.005 0.037 0.009
CX 0.026 0.006 0.025 0.010
FX 0.019 0.005 0.015 0.008
GX2/100 −0.116 0.034 −0.097 0.070
CX2/100 −0.065 0.039 −0.024 0.063
FX2/100 −0.077 0.040 −0.182 0.065
S.D. of Career Match Quality, σθ 0.188 0.010 0.054 0.013
S.D. of Employer Match Quality, σξ 0.238 0.007 0.267 0.010
S.D. of iid Shocks, σε 0.240 0.001 0.264 0.001
is not statistically signiﬁcant. Interestingly, the returns to general experience of college graduates
are substantially larger than those of high school graduates, but their returns to employer tenure
are almost zero. This signiﬁcant difference in human capital transferability across careers and
ﬁrms suggests that the nature of career is very different between high school graduates and college
graduates.
Previouspapers, includingParent(2000), KambourovandManovskii(2007), andPavan(2006)
also estimate the returns to career experience and employer tenure. The results across these papers
and this paper cannot be directly compared because all of them use different data, variable deﬁ-
nitions, and estimation strategies. Nevertheless, I ﬁnd it useful to clarify what is common across
these papers and what is new in this paper. First I discuss the returns to employer tenure. Parent
(2000) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2007) ﬁnd no return to tenure, while Pavan (2006) ﬁnd a
positive (4% in ﬁve years) return. This paper shows that it is 7% for high school graduates and
0% for college graduates. Notice that only the estimates by Kambourov and Manovskii (2007) are
from the PSID. This paper and Pavan (2006) use a structural approach and ﬁnd a positive return to
employer tenure, while Parent (2000) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2007) estimate the model
by the instrumental variable method. However, all the results are largely consistent with each other
in that the estimated return to employer tenure is much lower than that reported by Topel (1991),
which is 25% for ten-year tenure, once career-speciﬁc experience is controlled.
Second, I examine the returns to career-speciﬁc experience. Parent (2000) reports that ﬁve
yearsofcontinuousindustryexperienceincreasesthelogwageby0.15. KambourovandManovskii
(2007) use the PSID and ﬁnd that ﬁve years of occupation-speciﬁc experience increases the log-
wage by between 0.12 and 0.20. Pavan (2006) estimates the return to ﬁve-year career experience is
about 0.05. I ﬁnd that ﬁve years of continuous career-speciﬁc experience increases the logwage of
high school graduates by 0.11 and that of college graduates by 0.12. My results are in comparable
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Table 5: Cumulative Returns to Experiences (High school)
2 Years 5 Years 8 Years
Estimates Std. Dev. Estimates Std. Dev. Estimates Std. Dev.
General Experience 0.035 0.009 0.069 0.018 0.082 0.022
Career Speciﬁc Experience 0.049 0.010 0.112 0.020 0.164 0.025
Employer Tenure 0.034 0.008 0.074 0.016 0.099 0.019
Table 6: Cumulative Returns to Experiences (College)
2 Years 5 Years 8 Years
Estimates Std. Dev. Estimates Std. Dev. Estimates Std. Dev.
General Experience 0.070 0.016 0.161 0.032 0.235 0.039
Career Speciﬁc Experience 0.049 0.018 0.118 0.035 0.183 0.042
Employer Tenure 0.022 0.013 0.028 0.025 0.002 0.030
scale to those of Parent (2000) and Kambourov and Manovskii (2007), but only Pavan (2006) re-
ports a small return. Pavan (2006) assumes that career skills grow stochastically with a linear drift
for computational tractability. Consequently, the logwage growth shows a convex proﬁle within a
career and he reports the return to ten-year career experience is 0.13. My results and the other two
papers ﬁnd a concave proﬁle along a career spell. While not all papers agree with the magnitude of
the returns, the bottom line is that the career-speciﬁc experience substantially increases the wage,
and its effects are stronger than the employer tenure.
The different nature of careers between high school graduates and college graduates is also re-
ﬂected in the dispersion of match-quality distributions. The estimated standard deviation of career-
match quality is 0.19 for high school graduates and 0.05 for college graduates, which implies that
college graduates beneﬁt less from career search than high school graduates. On the other hand, the
estimated standard deviations of employer-match quality are of a similar magnitude between the
two. They are 0.24 for high school graduates and 0.27 for college graduates. This result suggests
that college graduates learn about their future careers before they enter to the labor market, while
high school graduates learn about careers by experiencing different jobs.
The parameter estimates for the utility function are presented in table 7. The intercepts for
both education groups are signiﬁcantly positive. The coefﬁcient for being married is signiﬁcantly
negative for college graduates, while it is negative but insigniﬁcant for high school graduates.
Income from a wife reduces the monetary incentive for a husband. The coefﬁcients for having
children are signiﬁcantly positive for both education groups. In contrast to the income effect of a
wife, children increase work incentives.
Table 8 presents the parameter estimates for the entry cost function. For both education groups,
theentry costtoa newemployerwithinthe samecareeris higherthanthe entrycostto anewcareer,
regardless of current employment status. When an individual enters a new career, he searches for a
job across occupations and industries. So, he has a number of potential employers across the labor
market. However, if he looks for a job within the same career, he has fewer potential employers
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Table 7: Utility Function
High School College
Estimates Std. Dev. Estimates Std. Dev.
Intercept, α0 0.102 0.022 0.134 0.035
Married, αM −0.008 0.019 −0.031 0.017
Has Children, αK 0.047 0.019 0.055 0.017
Type 2, α0,r=2 0.110 0.012 0.084 0.019
Type 3, α0,r=3 0.015 0.010 0.058 0.017
Type 4, α0,r=4 0.066 0.010 0.025 0.018
Table 8: Cost Function
High School College
Estimates Std. Dev. Estimates Std. Dev.
New Employer (for the employed), γe,e 1.857 0.128 1.268 0.233
New Career (for the employed), γe,c 1.406 0.138 1.162 0.280
New Employer (for the unemployed), γu,e 2.929 0.204 2.424 0.392
New Career (for the unemployed), γu,c 1.586 0.148 1.559 0.315
Married, γM 0.177 0.100 0.102 0.155
Has Children, γK 0.030 0.110 0.170 0.187
Type 2, γ0,r=2 −0.723 0.143 0.099 0.260
Type 3, γ0,r=3 0.246 0.207 0.268 0.258
Type 4, γ0,r=4 −1.329 0.148 −0.380 0.258
because he stays in a subset of the labor market. In other words, job search is more restrictive
when an individual changes jobs within the same career. Even though a within-career job change
is costly, he may transfer his career-speciﬁc skills and good match quality to the next job. When an
individual moves to a new career, he pays a lower cost, but loses career-speciﬁc skills and match
quality. The new career match quality can be worse than the current one. Being married and having
children increase the cost of entering a new job, which is quite intuitive.
Notice that the entry costs of college graduates are lower than those of high school graduates.
This implies that the low job mobility of college graduates (see table 1 and table 2) are driven not
by the direct mobility cost, but by the opportunity cost of losing accumulated skills and match
qualities. In particular, high returns to career experience for college graduates explain their high
proportion of within-career employer changes.
Table 9: Type Weight
High School College
Estimates Std. Dev. Estimates Std. Dev.
πr=2 0.226 0.027 0.170 0.031
πr=3 0.134 0.030 0.494 0.042
πr=4 0.431 0.040 0.275 0.037
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4.1 Model Fit
This subsection presents evidence on how well the model is able to ﬁt several aspects of the data.
Figure 1 presents logwage-experience proﬁles. As seen, the model ﬁt for the wage proﬁle is pretty
good. The model ﬁt for the fraction of working individuals is shown in ﬁgure 2. The model ﬁt for
thisdimensionofthedataisalsogoodforbotheducationgroups, althoughthepredictionintheﬁrst
couple of years is slightly higher than the data. Figure 3 through 6 present the choice distribution
of working individuals. The model replicates the upward trend of the probability of staying with
the same employer. However, the probabilities are underestimated for both education groups,
particularly for those who have ﬁve years or more experience. The model ﬁt for the probability
thatindividualschangeemployerswithinthesamecareerispresentedinﬁgure4. Themodelshows
a good ﬁt to this aspect of the data. Figure 5 shows the model ﬁt for career change probability. The
model reproduces the downward trend of career change probability, but the predictions are higher
for those who have ﬁve years or more experience for both education groups. Figure 6 plots the
probability that individuals choose not to work. Except for the high school graduates who have no
work experience, the model ﬁts the data very well. The key feature of the data, the upward trend in
within-career employer change, is presented in ﬁgure 7. The model is not expected to ﬁt the data
year by year, because the observed trend is noisy due to the small sample size. As seen, the model
generates an upward trend for both education groups. The predictions seem to be lower than the
data for high school graduates who have ﬁve years of experience or more, but the model shows a
steady increase in experience. The model ﬁt for college graduates seems to be good.
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Note: Dots are smoothed data plots by local polynomial regression and dashed lines present the
95% conﬁdence interval. The thick solid line is the model prediction.
Figure 1: Logwage Proﬁle
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Note: Dots are smoothed data plots by local polynomial regression and dashed lines present the
95% conﬁdence interval. The thick solid line is the model prediction.
Figure 2: Fraction of Working Individuals
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Note: Dots are smoothed data plots by local polynomial regression and dashed lines present the
95% conﬁdence interval. The thick solid line is the model prediction.
Figure 3: The Probability of Staying with the Same Employer
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Note: Dots are the data plot and dashed lines present the 95% conﬁdence interval. The thick solid
line is the model prediction.
Figure 4: The Probability of Employer Change within the Same Career
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Note: Dots are smoothed data plots by local polynomial regression and dashed lines present the
95% conﬁdence interval. The thick solid line is the model prediction.
Figure 5: The Probability of Career Change
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Note: Dots are smoothed data plots by local polynomial regression and dashed lines present the
95% conﬁdence interval. The thick solid line is the model prediction.
Figure 6: The Probability of Non-Working
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Note: Dots are smoothed data plots by local polynomial regression and dashed lines present the
95% conﬁdence interval. The thick solid line is the model prediction. Only those who worked for
two consecutive years are included.
Figure 7: The Fraction of Employer Change within Career (given any job change.)
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5 Discussion
5.1 Wage Growth Decomposition
The parameter estimates are used for a simulation to evaluate the contributions of experiences and
matchqualitiestothewagegrowthrate. Becausethelogwageislinearlyseparable, thecontribution
to the wage growth rate is measured by the logwage difference from the initial one. The decompo-
sition results are presented for each education group in table 10. Wages of high school graduates
grow by about 47%, while wages of college graduates grow by about 67% during their ﬁrst ten
years in the labor market. These predicted wage growth rates are consistent with the ﬁndings by
Weiss and Rubinstein (2005) across different data sets including the NLSY.
For high school graduates, the contributions from match quality upgrading account for about
half of the wage growth during the ﬁrst ten years. They are greater than the contributions from
career-speciﬁc experience and tenure that account for about a third of the wage growth. The re-
maining 17% is explained by the effect of general work experience. The simulation results suggest
that both career and employer search are important for high school graduates to increase their
wages.
For college graduates, general experience is by far the most important factor for wage growth.
It accounts for about 40% of the wage growth during the ﬁrst ten years. The effects of match
quality and speciﬁc experiences are very different between career level and employer level. The
cumulative contribution of career-match quality is as small as 2% for the ﬁrst ten years, while the
contribution of employer-match quality is 18%, which accounts for about a quarter of the wage
growth rate in the ﬁrst ten years. In contrast, wages grow by 18% because of career-speciﬁc expe-
rience, while employer tenure contributes little to wage growth. The small contribution of career
match quality upgrading for college graduates suggests that college education provides useful in-
formation for career building. College graduates learn about their comparative advantage and their
suitable careers while they are in school. They enter the labor market with a good match quality
from the outset, and thus, career-match quality does not grow very much over time. However,
college education does not provide information about what particular employer has a good match
with each individual. College graduates, as well as high school graduates, have to ﬁnd a good
employer through trial and error.
5.2 Career Mobility
Thissubsectionstudiestheeffectsofspeciﬁcexperiencesandmatchingoncareermobility. Search-
ing for a better match quality is one of the important motivations of employer and career changes as
shown by the basic model described in subsection 2.1. But the returns to career-speciﬁc experience
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Table 10: Wage Growth Decomposition by Years of General Experience.
High School College
3 years 5 years 10 years 3 years 5 years 10 years
General Exp. 0.048 0.069 0.080 0.103 0.161 0.274
Career Exp. 0.047 0.072 0.126 0.056 0.090 0.183
Career Match 0.056 0.078 0.113 0.011 0.015 0.020
Employer Ten. 0.020 0.029 0.046 0.015 0.018 0.007
Employer Match 0.052 0.068 0.105 0.090 0.123 0.181
Total 0.223 0.316 0.470 0.275 0.407 0.665
Note: The cumulative contributions to wage growth are decomposed into ﬁve factors. The growth rate is measured by
logwage difference from the ﬁrst year logwage.
andemployertenuremayalsohavesubstantialeffectsonmobilitydecisions. Theestimationresults
indicate that the returns to career-speciﬁc experience are large for both high school graduates and
college graduates. These results imply that individuals prefer a within-career employer change to
across-career employer change because they want to avoid a loss of career-speciﬁc human capital.
To evaluate the relative effects of speciﬁc experiences and match qualities on career mobility,
the model is simulated under four different assumptions. In the ﬁrst simulation, all parameters
are set to the estimated value. This simulation result is referred to as the benchmark case result.
In the second simulation, the returns to career-speciﬁc experience and employer tenure are set to
zero by setting coefﬁcients for speciﬁc experience and tenure zero. In this simulation, the match
qualities are the only driving force of increasing fraction of within-career employer change. In the
third simulation, match qualities do not change over time, which is implemented by setting the
variances of match qualities zero. In the fourth simulation, the effects of both speciﬁc experiences
and match qualities are turned off.
The simulation results for the employer change rate are presented in table 11. In the benchmark
case, employer change rates decrease with years of experience for both education groups. If both
speciﬁc experience and match quality are removed from the model as in the fourth simulation, the
employer change rates are increased and they present little downward trend. The remaining small
trend of the employer change rate is due to the fact that more and more individuals get married
and have children over time, which increases the cost of employer change. For both high school
graduates and college graduates, speciﬁc experiences are more important than match qualities in
accounting for the employer change rate. The rates are closer to the benchmark case result when
speciﬁc experiences are included. However, neither speciﬁc experiences nor match qualities alone
explain the entire employer change rate. The joint effect of these two is found to be important.
The simulation results for the fraction of within-career employer change are presented in table
12. For high school graduates, speciﬁc experiences generate a higher fraction of within-career
employer change, but the joint effect is also important. In contrast, for college graduates, speciﬁc
experiences explain the most of the fractions. This is consistent with the result above that the
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Table 11: Employer Change Rate by Years of General Experience
High School College
3 years 5 years 10 years 3 years 5 years 10 years
Experience and Matching 0.324 0.293 0.217 0.259 0.203 0.159
Matching Only 0.383 0.383 0.352 0.314 0.277 0.236
Experience Only 0.361 0.349 0.315 0.265 0.236 0.219
None 0.409 0.409 0.398 0.333 0.325 0.320
Table 12: The Fraction of Within-Career Employer Change by Years of General Experience
High School College
3 years 5 years 10 years 3 years 5 years 10 years
Experience and Matching 0.457 0.520 0.593 0.634 0.731 0.885
Matching Only 0.407 0.405 0.424 0.485 0.482 0.491
Experience Only 0.456 0.457 0.495 0.673 0.717 0.870
None 0.383 0.394 0.409 0.459 0.482 0.481
Note: The model is simulated under four different assumptions. The results in the ﬁrst row are from the simulation of
the estimated model, i.e., the effects of both speciﬁc experiences and match quality on employer are incorporated. In
the second simulation (see the results in the second row) the returns to speciﬁc experience including employer tenure
are set to zero with all other parameters remain the same as the benchmark simulation. In the third simulation, all
career- and employer-match qualities are homogeneous. In the fourth simulation, both of the two are shut off.
contribution of career match to wage is small, while that of career-speciﬁc experience is large.
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6 Conclusion
This paper constructs and estimates a structural model of career decisions in which workers search
for both career matching and employer matching. The model departs from previous contributions
in that it incorporates career mobility decisions and participation decisions, as well as the wage
function. The simulation evidence shows that the model is ﬂexible enough to ﬁt some interesting
features of the data from the NLSY.
The estimation results indicate that wage growth patterns and career mobility are quite dif-
ferent between high school graduates and college graduates, an aspect to which the wage growth
literature has given scant attention. I ﬁnd that human capital is more transferable across careers
and employers for college graduates than high school graduates. The returns to general experience
for college graduates are more than twice as high as those for high school graduates. However,
employer tenure little increases college graduates’ wage, while high school graduates receive sub-
stantial returns to tenure. Another interesting ﬁnding is that career match quality upgrading during
the ﬁrst ten years in the labor market increases college graduates’ wages by only 2%, which is
considerably smaller than that for high school graduates (11%). Consequently, college graduates
are less likely to search for jobs across careers than high school graduates. One interpretation of
this ﬁnding is that college graduates learn about their future careers before they enter a labor mar-
ket, while high school graduates learn about careers by experiencing different jobs. These results
suggest that accounting for the different nature of careers across education groups is important to
understand wage growth and career decisions of workers.
Some interesting questions remain unanswered. First, the effects of education on career choice
are not assessed in this paper. Because education is treated as exogenous, causality of education
for career and wage is not identiﬁed, although this paper ﬁnds a strong correlation. Second, skill
difference across careers is not studied. The result suggests that tasks and skills are very different
across careers. Although this paper studies skill progression within a career and separation from
it, the choice among different careers and skill progression across careers are ignored. These
interesting questions will be answered by future researches.
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Table 13: Transition Probability Estimation for Marital Status
High School College
Estimates Std. Dev. Estimates Std. Dev.
Intercept −1.635 2.087E−03 −2.154 5.726E−03
Age-17 2.592 2.724E−02 4.207 1.312E−01
Lagged Marital Status 0.252 1.470E−01 −0.804 1.757E+00
Lagged Children 0.037 2.146E−05 0.078 4.697E−05
Lagged Marital Status * (Age-17) 0.111 1.931E−01 0.074 2.087E+00
Lagged Children * (Age-17) 0.011 2.234E−04 −0.084 7.683E−04
Lagged Marital Status * Lagged Children −0.016 8.290E−04 0.065 9.457E−03
Lagged Marital Status * Lagged Children * (Age-17) −0.009 1.151E−03 0.005 1.124E−02
Note: Thedependentvariableisanindicatorvariablethattakesoneifanindividualismarriedandtakeszerootherwise.
Table 14: Transition Probability Estimation for Children.
High School College
Estimates Std. Dev. Estimates Std. Dev.
Intercept −2.184 4.116E−03 −3.061 2.894E−02
Age-17 1.865 1.779E−02 1.768 6.412E−02
Lagged Marital Status 2.042 9.344E−02 1.502 5.461E−01
Lagged Children 0.045 3.842E−05 0.067 2.081E−04
Lagged Marital Status * (Age-17) −0.669 1.271E−01 1.418 8.138E−01
Lagged Children * (Age-17) −0.082 1.397E−04 −0.035 4.073E−04
Lagged Marital Status * Lagged Children 0.034 5.927E−04 0.086 4.438E−03
Lagged Marital Status * Lagged Children * (Age-17) 0.047 8.150E−04 −0.077 5.795E−03




The results for an expanded college graduate sample are reported in the following. This expanded
sample includes those who went to graduate school right after completing undergraduate study, in
addition to all individuals in the main college graduate sample. The sample size is 570. As seen
below, the results are not quite different from those of the main sample.
Table 15: Summary Statistics for College Graduates
Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max. Nobs
Age 21.00 24.00 26.00 26.59 29.00 35.00 3933
General Experience 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.73 5.00 13.00 3933
Career Experience 0.00 0.00 1.00 2.33 4.00 13.00 3933
Employer Tenure 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.51 2.00 12.00 3933
Employers per Individual 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.25 3.00 8.00 570
Careers per Individual 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.46 2.00 7.00 570
Employers within Career per Individual 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.79 1.00 5.00 570
Years Surveyed per Individuals 1.00 3.00 7.00 6.90 10.00 15.00 570
Job Change Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.00 1.00 2978
Career Change Rate 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 1.00 2978
Wage (2000 CPI) 1.04 12.12 17.03 18.44 22.34 98.24 3414
Married (at age 30) 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.65 1.00 1.00 269
Has Children (at age 30) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 1.00 1.00 269
Table 16: Wage Equation
Estimates Std. Dev.
Intercept (Type 1) 1.747 0.080
Intercept (Type 2) 2.184 0.039
Intercept (Type 3) 2.590 0.037







S.D. of Career Match Quality, σθ 0.064 0.012
S.D. of Employer Match Quality, σξ 0.270 0.009
S.D. of iid Shocks, σε 0.262 0.001
Table 17: Cumulative Returns to Experiences (College)
2 Years 5 Years 8 Years
Estimates Std. Dev. Estimates Std. Dev. Estimates Std. Dev.
General Experience 0.084 0.016 0.182 0.030 0.244 0.037
Career Speciﬁc Experience 0.039 0.016 0.103 0.033 0.173 0.040
Employer Tenure 0.023 0.012 0.034 0.023 0.017 0.027
32B ADDITIONAL RESULTS
Table 18: Utility Function
Estimates Std. Dev.
Intercept, α0 0.143 0.037
Married, αM −0.035 0.016
Has Children, αK 0.053 0.016
Type 2, α0,r=2 0.083 0.020
Type 3, α0,r=3 0.058 0.018
Type 4, α0,r=4 0.024 0.019
Table 19: Cost Function
Estimates Std. Dev.
New Employer (for the employed), γe,e 1.293 0.227
New Career (for the employed), γe,c 1.199 0.270
New Employer (for the unemployed), γu,e 2.829 0.374
New Career (for the unemployed), γu,c 1.656 0.308
Married, γM 0.232 0.146
Has Children, γK 0.089 0.174
Type 2, γ0,r=2 −0.004 0.249
Type 3, γ0,r=3 0.213 0.248
Type 4, γ0,r=4 −0.365 0.254
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